Nerea Lozano
LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY DIVISION
Last June, we analysed the entry into force of Law 2/2025 of 29 April, which amended Article 49 of the revised text of the Workers’ Statute Act, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 2/2015, thereby bringing an end to the automatic termination of employment contracts following a declaration of permanent incapacity.
As we noted at the time, this was less a genuine substantive innovation than the codification of an interpretative line that the courts had already anticipated: contractual termination based solely on a declaration of incapacity could be discriminatory if the impossibility of adaptation or reassignment had not first been demonstrated.
Recent Supreme Court case law has now clarified the true scope of this employer obligation and, above all, its procedural consequences.
In this regard, the Supreme Court judgment of 22 December 2025 (appeal no. 3965/2024) examines a case in which the employee, who had worked for the company since 1999 and held the category of skilled employee, performed duties as a sales assistant in the gardening section. Following several periods of temporary incapacity and medical assessments in which she had been declared “fit with limitations”, the occupational health service ultimately issued a report declaring her “unfit” for the position.
The report set out very specific limitations: restrictions on handling loads, inability to remain standing for prolonged periods, prohibition of lumbar flexion-extension postures, lifting arms above shoulder height, or kneeling. The job functions included handling weight, stocking goods, physical exertion, continuous movement and standing throughout the working day.
On the basis of this report, the company proceeded with an objective dismissal for supervening ineptitude under Article 52(a) of the revised text of the Workers’ Statute Act (Royal Legislative Decree 2/2015).
Both the Labour Court and the High Court of Justice declared the dismissal unfair. The company lodged an appeal for the unification of case law, submitting as a conflicting precedent the judgment of the Social Chamber of the High Court of Justice of Castilla-La Mancha of 9 February 2023 (appeal no. 2284/2022), which had held that a declaration of “unfit” exempted the employer from the obligation to reassign.
The Supreme Court found a contradiction between the two rulings: in both cases, there was a dismissal for supervening ineptitude based on a prevention service report declaring the worker “unfit”, yet in one case proof of the impossibility of adaptation or reassignment was required, while in the other the medical report was deemed sufficient.
The central issue, therefore, was whether the employer may terminate the contract solely on the basis of the occupational health service report.
The Court relied on its own prior case law, particularly Judgment 177/2022, and recalled that prevention services are tasked with monitoring workers’ health and informing on their fitness in relation to workplace risks, pursuant to Article 22 of the Occupational Risk Prevention Act.
However, a declaration of “unfit” does not in itself constitute full proof of supervening ineptitude for termination purposes. Its purpose is preventive, not dismissive. For safety reasons, the employer may remove the worker from the position, but may not automatically terminate the contract solely on the basis of that opinion.
The report must precisely identify the specific functional limitations and their impact on the job’s duties. A generic statement of loss of aptitude is insufficient unless duly justified and supported by additional evidence.
The judgment reinforces a key point: an employer who chooses to terminate under Article 52(a) of the Workers’ Statute assumes the burden of proving that it has first complied with its prior obligations.
In the case at hand, the Supreme Court found that the company had not demonstrated any attempt at adaptation or reassignment to a compatible position. Nor had it justified the existence of an excessive burden. Accordingly, the termination was correctly classified as an unfair dismissal.
The Court expressly incorporates the doctrine of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 8 January 2024 (Case C-631/22), which held that automatic termination of an employment contract due to permanent incapacity arising from disability, without first implementing reasonable accommodations, is contrary to Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC.
The Supreme Court adopts this interpretation and integrates it into its analysis of Article 52(a) of the Workers’ Statute, emphasising that a change of position may constitute an appropriate reasonable accommodation provided that it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.
Although Law 2/2025 did not apply ratione temporis to the facts of the case, the Chamber refers to it as evidence of the adaptation of domestic law to the aforementioned European doctrine, thereby reinforcing the interpretative line now consolidated.
In conclusion, case law has now firmly established the employer’s obligation to attempt adaptation and reassignment following a declaration of permanent incapacity of an employee. Supervening ineptitude remains an objective ground for termination, but its application requires a prior assessment of possible adaptation or reassignment consistent with the principles of equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of disability.
